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Limiting corruption in Bulgarian society calls not only for institutional and
legal measures but also for establishing the rule of law. In this sense, it is of
crucial importance to foster a political and economic culture based on
trust and respect for public institutions, on transparency and openness in
the actions of public administration, and the will to achieve stability and
predictability of the economic and social environment.
Coalition 2000 is an initiative of Bulgarian non-governmental organiza-
tions which was launched in the Spring of 1997 aimed at limiting corrup-
tion in Bulgarian society through a partnership between state institutions,
non-governmental organizations, and individual personalities, who devel-
oped and have been implementing an Anti-Corruption Action Plan, Cor-
ruption Monitoring System, and an anti-corruption public awareness cam-
paign.
The Corruption Assessment Report 1999 follows the structure and ap-
proach of the Action Plan adopted by the Policy Forum of Coalition 2000
in November 1998. It presents a general evaluation of the state and dy-
namic of corruption in Bulgarian society and of the efforts to counteract it
in 1999.
This second edition of the Corruption Assessment Report reflects sugges-
tions and comments made at the Policy Forum (December 1999) of Coa-
lition 2000.
Coalition 2000
1 Lazar Stanev Street
1113 Sofia, Bulgaria
Tel.: (359-2) 971 3000
Fax: (359-2) 971 2233
coalition2000@online.bg
www.online.bg/coalition2000
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INTRODUCTION
The chief purpose of the present report is to propose a general evaluation
of the status and dynamics of corruption over the past year. The proposed
analysis draws on authoritative international assessments of the situation
in this country, as well as domestic evaluation indicators about the spread
(frequency of occurrence) of various corrupt practices.
The Corruption Assessment Report 1999 also analyzes the changes
which have occurred in various public spheres and which have brought
about (or might bring about) changes in corruption dynamics. Special
attention is devoted to the processes in public institutions (regulatory frame-
work and manner of implementing certain procedures), the court system,
the state and dynamic of the legislation, the functioning of the economy
and the mechanisms for state intervention in the micro and macro-eco-
nomic environment, the degree of alignment of the countrys legislation
and procedures with international standards.
The Report is based on the
concept of corruption laid down
in the Coalition 2000 Action Plan
(adopted by the Policy Forum in
November 1998) that corruption
is any form of abuse of power 
economic, political, and admin-
istrative  for personal or group
gain to the detriment of the rights
and legitimate interests of the in-
dividual, of a specific commu-
nity, or the entire society.
At the end of 1999 it can
be observed that the problem of
corruption has been assuming in-
creasing public and political im-
portance.
l Whereas in early 1999 the subject of corruption was the natural mo-
nopoly of the political opposition and of the critically inclined media,
by the end of the year the debate has come to involve basic struc-
tures of civil society, all the leading media, the institutions of the
executive, legislative and the judiciary.
l The focus of anti-corruption pressure, which used to fall on corrupt
practices on a local and regional level, by the end of the year has
shifted towards those zones which the public generally defines as the
corruption at the top.
l Increasingly popular on a mass consciousness level is the explana-
tory model according to which corruption in Bulgaria is one of the
MAIN PROBLEMS FACED BY BULGARIA*
 February 99 April 99 September 99 
Unemployment 58.4 64.1 64.6 
Low incomes 51.3 49.1 50.2 
Corruption 38.5 34.2 38.5 
Poverty 31.6 32.9 37.1 
Crime 45.4 32.9 32.4 
Source: Corruption Monitoring System (CMS) of Coalition 2000.
See www.online.bg/coalition2000 for details regarding the methodology of
the surveys included in CMS.
Note: 1) % of those who indicated each factor.
2) Up to three alternatives have been assessed, which is why the sum total of
percentages exceeds 100.
CORRUPTION AND THE PRIORITIES OF SOCIETY
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chief obstacles to the successful functioning of democratic institu-
tions, to the Europeanization of Bulgarian society, the economic re-
forms, and to addressing the problem of crime.
These circumstances have all turned corruption from a peripheral,
into a priority topic on the public agenda.
In response to the increased public pressure the political class in Bul-
garia has also come to be greatly activated in the past few months. The
fight against corruption assumed new dimensions after the President and
Vice President showed their commitment to it through  publicly expressed
positions. They pointedly raised the problem as being of fatal importance
to the political class and appealed to the institutions of power to start the
fight against corruption from their own ranks.
For the first time in the past
years, government itself, rather
than just the opposition, is
openly referring to corruption in
the high ranks of government.
The Prime Minister also firmly en-
dorsed this position and called for
the removal of the political um-
brella over the corrupt, even
when they are part of the politi-
cal elite.
These public commitments
could facilitate the formation of
a political will able to transform
the political awareness of the
corruption problem into prac-
tical measures against it. How-
ever, the political commitments
have not yet become an actual
policy.
Source: Coalition 2000 CMS.
ASSESSMENTS OF THE MAGNITUDE OF CORRUPTION
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A. CREATING A FAVORABLE INSTITUTIONAL
AND LEGAL ENVIRONMENT FOR CURBING
CORRUPTION
A.1. Public
Administration
Reform and the
Role of the State
One important precondition for counteracting corruption is to enact ef-
fective institutional mechanisms in the political system and civil society
on the basis of clear rules. The legal and institutional preconditions ought
above all to help foster a social and political environment unfavorable to
corruption. Along with the general preventive and stabilizing effect they
also ought to lead to a clearer regulation of the liabilities and sanctions for
the perpetration of acts of corruption.
Making all power structures, and particularly public administration, trans-
parent and accountable is of utmost importance to curbing corruption in
its manifold manifestations.
The more notable among the legislative measures undertaken in this
area in the course of the past year are:
l The Administration Act, in force since December 6, 1998, contains
relatively detailed provisions regarding the powers of the bodies of
the executive, the structure and organization of their administration.
However, on a number of key issues for the curbing of corruption the
provisions are of a general and a recommendatory nature and refer
the specific regulation to separate laws, regulatory or internal institu-
tional acts, which for the most part have not yet been drafted or
adopted.
l The reform in the sphere of administrative services is at a most rudi-
mentary stage. The Administrative Servicing of Natural and Legal
Persons Act was enacted in the beginning of November 1999 and it
is still too early to evaluate its enforcement. All the more that the
procedures and organization of administrative services are yet to be
determined.
l The Civil Service  Act, in force since August 28, 1999, only regulates
the general requirements for acquiring the status of a civil servant,
including under the provisions of special laws, the recruitment proce-
dures, the rights, obligations, and liability (disciplinary and property)
of public officials. The range of persons, defined as public servants,
has not been exhaustively regulated. Officials in the judiciary, for in-
stance, are not assigned the status of civil servants. In view of the
particular characteristics of their work and the responsibility they carry
for the quality of judicial administration, their status of public officials
needs to be specially regulated through an amendment to the Judici-
ary  Act, which means indefinite postponement in time. There is a
call for greater conceptual clarity regarding the areas of application
of the Labor Code and the newly adopted Civil Service Act.
It is still too early to tell whether the obligation of public officials to
declare their property status (when first assuming their position and there-
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According to the public many of the factors contributing to the spread of cor-
ruption are immediately related to the structure and functioning of the public
sphere. It is commonly believed that this sphere is both conducive to corrupt
practices and does not create regulatory and functional preconditions for curb-
ing those practices.
MAIN FACTORS INFLUENCING THE SPREAD OF CORRUPTION IN BULGARIA (%)*
 February 99 April 99 September 99 
The desire for fast enrichment 
by those in power 
53.5  52.9  54.8 
Low remuneration 51.9  51.5  43.6 
Inadequate legislation 41.1  38.8  37.8 
Lack of strict administrative 
control 
35.2  36.4  33.8 
Conflict of official obligations 
and private interest 
25.1  25.8  28.3 
Ineffectiveness of the court 
system 
26.4  19.6  27.5 
The moral crisis in the period of 
transition 
19.4  19.4  19.4 
The problems inherited from 
the communist past 
10.9  6.8  7.4 
The specific characteristics of 
Bulgarian culture 
5.7  6.9  4.7 
Source: Coalition 2000 CMS
Notes: 1) % of those citing each factor
2) up to three factors have been evaluated, which is why the sum total of
percentages exceeds 100
FACTORS FOR THE SPREAD OF CORRUPTION
after annually, by March 31, before the recruiting authority) will prove a
sufficiently deterring factor for corrupt practices or how effective the con-
trol over its enforcement will be. Clearly, however, developing the regula-
tory framework on the  financial and property status of public officials
is of key importance to curtailing
corrupt practices. It needs further
development and strict regulation
of the powers of the control au-
thorities (including the State Ad-
ministrative Commission with the
Council of Ministers which is pro-
vided for by the law to oversee
the civil service) and the sanctions
in this sphere. It is also indispen-
sable to introduce a public regis-
ter of the property and incomes
of senior public officials.
The new customs law, in
power since the beginning of
1999, implements European
standards and principles for the
work of the customs officers.  In
accordance with this law, many
measures for limitting corruption
and other illegal actions of the
customs officers are taken. The
introduction of mandatory
indentification cards as a part of
the uniforms of the customs of-
ficers, different ways of receiving
complaints and signals from per-
sons who have been affected by
the actions of customs officers
(special mail boxes in the
premises of the customs, hot phone lines, etc. ) is to be implemented .
It is necessary to accelerate the creation of more detailed regulations
(especially the adoption of the Instruction for the Internal Control), the
Code of Ethics in the Bulgarian Customs Administration, as well as better
interaction with other state institutions  courts, prosectution, investiga-
tion services, the Ministry of the Interior, Tax Administration, etc.
l The legislation regulating government and municipal procurement
has undergone dynamic development. With the passing of the Pub-
lic Procurement Act, in force since July 5, 1999, the former Govern-
ment and Municipal Procurement Act of 1997, which had proven its
inadequacy, was abolished. Even in the new law, however, despite
the proclaimed principles of public accountability and transparency,
free and fair competition, equal opportunities for participation of all
candidates, etc., the guarantees for putting those principles into prac-
tice have not been sufficiently elaborated. For instance, insufficiently
clear-cut criteria differentiating among the three possible procedures
 open, limited, by negotiations  still allow relatively broad possibili-
ties for state authorities and other assignors institutions to take discre-
tionary decisions. The implementation of the new legislation implies
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certain organizational and administrative preconditions and unless
these are promptly developed, it is destined for the same fate as the
preceding law.
l Despite the need for transparency in the functioning of public admin-
istration, access to public information has not been regulated. The
government draft law provoked a debate and contradictory positions
among the public at large.
l The Tax Procedure Code passed by the National Assembly (in force
from January 1, 2000) provides for extensive powers of the tax con-
trol authorities for conducting searches and appropriation beyond
the rules laid down in the Penal Procedure Code. There is a need for
further guarantees against possible misuse of those powers, as well
as clearer differentiation from the powers of police authorities.
l The draft law on the fight against corruption and financial crime
which has been introduced in Parliament provides for the setting up
of a special Government Agency for the Fight against Financial Crime
and Corruption (financial police)
as a specialized division with the
Council of Ministers, i.e. subor-
dinate to the executive. The en-
visioned status and rather broad
powers of this body, as well as
the fact that the draft law re-
duces corruption only to bribes
and embezzlement, give rise to
a number of questions  regard-
ing its effectiveness and the pos-
sible duplication with the pow-
ers of other special authorities
and divisions, as well as regard-
ing the constitutionality of the
legislative act under considera-
tion.
The review of the process
of creating legal preconditions to
counter corruption reveals a
number of deficiencies and
shortcomings. At the same time,
there are a number of possibili-
ties in other laws which are
hardly used by the authorities
and divisions with control func-
tions  for instance, the provi-
sions of the Citizens Property
Act, allowing for investigation of
unearned income, including of
high-ranking officials.
The process of democratic
transformation of the state is
continuing but state power still
remains extremely centralized.
The presence of the state is still
Citizens generally believe corruption is widespread in the various institutions of
the state. Along with the customs services, where the problem is clearly most
serious, the court system is also placed high in the rating. In the course of 1999
the mean values increased for most of the institutions, i.e. the image of the
institutions in the eyes of the public deteriorated and citizens had a firmer im-
pression of living in a society marked by a high level of corruption.
INDEX OF ASSESSMENTS OF THE SPREAD OF CORRUPTION IN THE INSTITUTIONS
(MEAN VALUES)
 April ’99 September ’99 
Customs 8.78 9.10 
Tax services 7.10 7.98 
Court system 7.62 7.88 
Privatization Agency 7.46 7.86 
Police 7.16 7.54 
Sector ministries 6.94 7.40 
Foreign Aid Agency 7.02 7.40 
District authorities 6.90 7.32 
Municipal administration 6.64 7.24 
Parliament 6.78 7.16 
Government 6.58 7.12 
Committee of Energy 6.40 6.84 
Committee of Posts and Telecommunications 5.86 6.42 
Commission for the Protection of Competition 6.14 6.40 
Securities and Stock Exchange Commission 6.24 6.28 
National Audit Office 5.74 5.86 
Bulgarian National Bank 5.34 5.32 
Army 4.88 5.06 
National Statistical Institute 4.80 4.54 
Presidents administration 4.46 4.50 
Source: Coalition 2000 CMS
Note: The maximum value of the index is 10.0 and indicates the highest level of
corruption. The minimum value is 0.0 and means absence of corruption in the
respective institution.
SPREAD OF CORRUPTION IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
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too strong with respect to economic and certain regulatory functions;
state property continues to play an important role in the economy, and
monopolization retains many of the territories gained. Licensing and per-
mit procedures continue to be among the areas most affected by corrup-
tion.
Furthermore, the institutions
of the state are still weak and in-
effective in terms of their protec-
tive role regarding the citizens,
and the necessary coordination
between them is lacking. This is
true for all three branches of
power to a varying degree.
The National Assembly still
needs to adopt modern regula-
tory instruments, in line with in-
ternational standards, which al-
low effective counteraction of
corruption and transcend the
narrow frames of the formal le-
gal approach. As a body of the
supreme national representation,
the standing parliamentary Com-
mittee for Counteracting Crime
and Corruption ought to become
a coordinating center and initia-
tor of legislative decisions for the
introduction of working mecha-
nisms for creating an institutional
and legal environment
unfavorable to the development
of corruption.
Even in the sphere of the ex-
ecutive branch of power there
has not been any substantial progress in curbing corruption:
l The discretionary powers of the administration in practice remain too
broad and uncontrollable, while the rights, obligations, and proce-
dures involved in the exercise of those powers are not sufficiently
clearly regulated.
l Little has been done about limiting corruption through strengthening
the control exercised by the National Audit Office, the bodies of
State Financial Control, the tax administration, the national agencies
within the structure of the Ministry of the Interior. Neither has the
regulation been improved of their competencies, interrelations with
other state institutions, and the coordination among them. The newly
created control agencies such as the Bureau for Financial Investiga-
tion with the Ministry of Finance, established by the Money Launder-
ing Act, and the Agency for interception and disclosure of tax viola-
tions (the so-called tax police) have failed to make full use of their
potential for reducing corruption. There is no actual system of moni-
toring and control over not accounted money flows which is what
corruption money always is.
Trust in the seriousness of the governments intentions and actions has been
declining continually. The public is convinced that the fight against corruption
is more determined as regards officials holding positions at the lower levels of
the administration; a significantly smaller number of citizens evaluate as serious
the efforts of the government among people with a higher administrative rank
and/or public status.
EVALUATIONS OF THE LEVEL OF SERIOUSNESS OF THE GOVERNMENTS ANTI-CORRUPTION
ACTIVITIES (AMONG THE FOLLOWING GROUPS)
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ASSESSMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENTS ACTIVITY IN THE FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION
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The decisive internal factors favoring corruption are still active. No
sufficiently effective measures have been taken to create a favorable insti-
tutional environment for preventing corruption and fostering anti-corrup-
tion attitudes and climate.
The democratic development of the system of political parties in Bulgaria
would tangibly reinforce institutional anti-corruption mechanisms. Instead,
the practice in this sphere has continued to favor the development of
corrupt practices. The reasons lie in:
l inadequate differentiation between the state and party sphere, be-
tween public and private interests;
l the absence of conditions for the development of legitimate sources
of financing and for control over the financing of parties and politi-
cians,
l the lack of legal preconditions for equal standing of the political par-
ties in election campaigns, for transparency of lobbying activity.
The belated debates on the legislative regulation of public financ-
ing of political parties continue. The positions in the discussion of the 5
draft laws introduced are grouped around the principles of a more liberal
regime of registration of political parties, but stricter requirements for par-
ticipation in elections; ban of for-profit activity, but with the possibility to
register companies under the Commercial Code , and so on. The legisla-
tive decision has been postponed for April 2000. Yet, even if it should be
adopted it would not actually be applied until the year 2001, under the
pretext of budgetary constraints. The slow progress on these matters holds
off the reform of the party system and the necessary differentiation of
private and public interests.
Over the past one-year period, as a result of the initiatives of Coali-
tion 2000 and the collaborative work with state institutions and a broad
range of non-governmental organizations and experts, support for the
idea of introducing a specialized national institution of the ombuds-
man type (peoples defender), has been growing. It would be an institu-
tion outside the power system for monitoring and control over the admin-
istration, a deterring factor against corruption and arbitrariness harming
the interests of citizens and their organizations. This is a mechanism, which
would not be competing with, or duplicating, the existing traditional mecha-
nisms, but would complement them in all instances of transgression of the
boundaries between the private and the public. The existence of these
boundaries is characteristic of the rule of law, i.e., when the bodies of
public power or non-governmental institutions assigned with public func-
tions fail to create the conditions for the free exercise of private rights and
freedoms, do not respect, or violate them. The idea for creating a mecha-
nism complementing and accompanying the slower court, administrative,
and other existing forms of protection has come to be shared by repre-
sentatives of the leading state institutions  the Chairman of the National
Assembly, the Vice President of the Republic, members of parliament,
representatives of the judiciary and the executive, as well as by civil soci-
ety.
A.2. Institutional and
Legal Mechanisms
for Differentiation
Between the Public
and Private Spheres
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B. REFORM OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM
B.1. Legislative Reform
One of the main directions of judicial reform is determined by the need to
exclude possibilities for corruption in the operation of the judiciary itself,
to build a system of sanctions against the various forms of corrupt behavior
and to create conditions for their effective penalization. Up to now, the
efforts in the chief areas of the judicial reform  legislative reform, court
administration reform, training of magistrates   have been aimed at creat-
ing a general organizational environment for implementation of domestic
law and international standards in counteracting corruption.
In 1999, further amendments to the procedural laws, aimed at speeding
up the administration of justice and enhancing its efficiency and transpar-
ency, were adopted.
The amendments to the Penal Procedure Code (in force from Janu-
ary 1, 2000) provide for:
l Turning the court phase of the trial into the principal one at the ex-
pense of the preliminary proceedings, the latter not being public and
thus more conducive to corrupt practices.
l Enhancing court control, especially as regards bail and other meas-
ures affecting human rights.
l Introducing the settlement principle  a court-sanctioned agree-
ment between the prosecution and the defense regarding the size of
the punishment as a procedural means of speeding up criminal pros-
ecution and of avoiding unregulated arrangements between de-
fendants and magistrates.
The amendments to the Civil Procedure Code, in force as of July
1999, are aimed at reducing to a minimum the possibilities for case post-
ponement and abuse of procedural rights. They envision:
l a speedier procedure for summoning the parties;
l fast proceedings in the case of disputes;
l introducing a complaint of delays which would ensure court con-
trol over unwarranted delays of court decisions forcing many of those
concerned to resort to bribes.
The Commercial Code is also about to be amended, which is par-
ticularly urgent with respect to speeding up procedures for declaring in-
solvency  one area marked by corrupt practices. Another such area are
the registers kept by the courts.
Although the alternative dispute resolution methods are widely rec-
ognized in professional legal circles as necessary and useful, no specific
steps have been undertaken to introduce and popularize specialized arbi-
tration and mediation for the resolution of a considerable part of the aris-
ing disputes outside the courts.
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B.2. Reform in the Or-
ganization of the
Judiciary. Qualifica-
tion and Training of
Magistrates.
The creation of comprehensive legal preconditions for counteracting
corruption necessarily presupposes the alignment of domestic law with
international standards in this area. This would have a positive impact on
anti-corruption activity on a domestic level, as well as on the countrys
participation in international cooperation for the prevention and expo-
sure of acts of international corruption. The beginning of this process has
been set. In 1999, Bulgaria signed three international conventions regulat-
ing the fight against corruption  Criminal Law Convention on Corrup-
tion of CE, Civil Law Convention on Corruption of the Council of Eu-
rope, and the Convention on the Fight against Bribery of Foreign Offi-
cials in International Business Transactions of OECD. Only the third
one has been ratified and it is in fulfillment of the commitments made
under this convention that the Amendment to the Penal Code Act was
passed on January 15, 1999. The law defines the term foreign official,
and the bribing of a foreign official in international business transactions is
declared a crime. The punishment in this case is the same as with active
bribery of local officials.
Notwithstanding this important step, insufficient measures have been
taken to bring the legislation in line with international anti-corruption
standards. This is true to the greatest extent to a clearer definition of the
forms of corruption, of the penal and civil legal liability for committing
such acts, and the protection of those adversely affected by them.
There has been no comprehensive screening of the acting legislation
as a step toward, on the one hand, the abolition of certain obsolete or
inconsistent provisions, and on the other, to the establishment of a mod-
ern, consistent legal framework which is in line with European standards.
The successful counteraction of corruption calls for a new organization of
the judiciary, which is inconceivable without well-educated, qualified mag-
istrates of high integrity, and an effective court administration staffed by
professionally trained and incorruptible officials.
l For the first time in 1999 important steps were taken to enhance the
professional skills of magistrates and train them to apply the anti-cor-
ruption legislation. A Magistrates Training Center was created and
started operating. The training programs are designed both to assist
magistrates in the prompt exposure and sanctioning of acts of cor-
ruption, and to help form sustained anti-corruption behavior models
among the magistrates themselves.
l The court administration reform is still at an early stage. The new
Ordinance on the Organization of Work in the Courts drafted at the
Ministry of Justice is expected to give impetus to the efforts to con-
fine possibilities for corruption by providing conditions for greater
public access and transparency of the administration of justice, by
modernizing and computerizing the work of the court administra-
tion. Coordinated efforts in this direction began with the creation in
October 1999 of an expert group with the Supreme Judicial Council
for drawing up an overall plan for computerizing court activity, which
would serve as the basis for designing integrated court filing system
software. The successful attainment of these objectives would facili-
tate citizens access to information in the courts and would foster
transparency and the possibility for administrative and public control
over the organization of the work.
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The need to speed up and further advance the judicial reform led
eight non-governmental organizations and representatives of governmen-
tal and international institutions to join their efforts in the Judicial Reform
Initiative for Bulgaria, developed on the model of Coalition 2000. The
draft consensus document  Program for Judicial Reform for Bulgaria
(www.csd.bg/jri), reviewed at broadly representative forums, constitutes
a good basis for further development of the judicial system in the desig-
nated directions.
Bulgaria would continue to hold one of the leading positions in
terms of corruption if there is no acceleration in the pace of creating the
necessary legal and institutional framework. This would, in turn, continue
to be a serious obstacle to the firm establishment of the democratic soci-
ety and to the countrys economic prosperity.
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C. FIGHTING CORRUPTION
IN THE ECONOMY
C.1. Privatization
Process
The deeper the involvement of the state in the economy, the greater the
resources distributed and controlled by officials throughout the entire ad-
ministrative structure and the greater the possibilities for corruption. When
assessing the corruption potential in the economy it is therefore neces-
sary to examine:
l how the role of the state as an immediate economic agent has
changed;
l how transparent and clean in terms of corrupt practices are the
mechanisms of property ownership transformation;
l what is happening in the field of post-privatization control;
l how the adopted mechanisms of governance of state participation
and state-owned property affect the attitudes and conduct of public
officials;
l what is the corruption potential of the access to, and distribution of,
external donor funds;
l to what extent is the business environment experiencing corruption
pressure.
In the past few years the share of state-owned property was sharply re-
duced. In 1998 about 65% of the gross added value in the economy was
generated by the private sector, while in 1999 this share is nearly 70%.
Since the beginning of 1999, 7% of the state-owned assets have been
privatized. This generally implies reduced possibilities for corruption in
the economy. Yet, while reducing the public share in the economy, the
administration is still trying to hold on to possibilities for control over
the privatized property. As it withdraws as owner, in most cases (and in
all of the large privatization deals) the state inevitably retains a share in the
privatized enterprises. This leaves the opportunity to trade the control.
The governance of state participation takes place through representa-
tives of the state (public officials) in the boards of directors of privatized
enterprises where some  state participation is maintained. Since such a
presence is typically remunerated and in many cases involves additional
benefits (company car, cellular telephone, access to recreation facilities,
etc.), it has a serious corruption potential. The second aspect of the prob-
lem concerns a kind of self-corruption of power. The participation in
(and above all, the appointment to) boards of directors is among the
main legitimate channels through which the higher echelons enlist cli-
entele from among the lower ranks of the power hierarchy.
This leads to the conclusion that the statistical data about the decreas-
ing amount of assets owned by the state do not as yet indicate a lesser
corruption potential. The latter remains in place since, while relinquishing
ownership, the state in many cases retains the possibilities for control.
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License requirements involve additional expenditures in starting a business in
Bulgaria. This increases the overall cost of carrying out business activity in the
country and at the same time limits competition. The data indicate a clear ten-
dency towards increase in the number of activities requiring a license or permit.
Since most of the requirements set in 1998 and 1999 were in line with the
harmonization of the legislation with the European standards, the tendency is
expected to continue.
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LICENSING REGIMES
C.1.1. PRIVATIZATION PROCEDURES
The process of privatization is an intricate knot of political and economic,
private and public interests which makes it particularly liable to corrup-
tion. The process itself is regulated by the Privatization and Transforma-
tion of State-Owned and Municipal Enterprises Act. Despite the repeated
amendments since its adoption in 1992, the changes have not abolished
the possibilities for corruption. The same could be said of most regula-
tions in this area.
The first problem of the privatiza-
tion process is the fact that it is bro-
ken up among various institutions –
ministries, the Privatization
Agency, municipal privatization
agencies. This „fragments” the pic-
ture, makes it extremely opaque,
and facilitates corruption. To a con-
siderable extent this is also due to
the lack of effective control – the
courts are the only option in this
respect. In order, however, for a
possible violation to be sanctioned
it is necessary to have clear-cut and
unequivocal rules.
The second problem is the
preferred technology of priva-
tization. Even in 1999 the tradi-
tion was maintained of privatiz-
ing mainly through negotiations
with potential buyers, particu-
larly in the typical, smaller deals.
No systematized data are avail-
able but according to various es-
timates, about 85% of all privati-
zation deals have been effected
through this procedure. It allows
the greatest possibilities for cor-
ruption, since:
l Negotiations with potential buyers are nontransparent and allow di-
rect bribery;
l Negotiations with potential buyers in the highest degree allow mak-
ing covert (non-public) commitments which substantially alter the vis-
ible parameters of the deal concluded (for instance, a commitment
for subsequent capital increase with preferential treatment of the
majority owner in the acquisition of the new issue).
This leads to the conclusion that the very way in which the state is
relinquishing its participation in the economy gives rise to corruption.
Full use is still not made of open tenders and the stock-exchange mecha-
nisms. There are many answers to the question why  not but one reason
which should be borne in mind is precisely the limited opportunities for
corruption that they offer.
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C.2. Evaluation
of Business
Conditions
C.1.2. POST-PRIVATIZATION CONTROL
The existing system of post-privatization control tends to be a source of,
rather than an obstacle to, corruption. The owners of already privatized
enterprises frequently obtain unexplainable concessions on the part of
the administration. Typical agreements concern:
l reduced obligations for investments in the enterprise privatized;
l review of clauses concerning the preservation of the number of jobs;
l change of the activity profile of the enterprise;
l debt remission;
l obligations under environmental requirements.
At the same time, post-privatization development is an area where
information is extremely scarce. The failure to abide by commitments made
upon the conclusion of the privatization contract is equally characteristic
of small management-and-employee owned companies, and key enter-
prises owned by large international companies. Again, it is important to
privatize  through mechanisms which do not require any subsequent con-
trol (auctions based on price only, stock exchange, centralized auctions
of the Mass Privatization Center).
In the course of the past ten years the gray economy became one of the
main generators of corrupt practices. Tax evasion, the avoidance of cus-
toms duties and fees have turned into a major strategy for reducing costs
and increasing profits. This gray sector of the economy has gradually
grown interconnected with organized crime under different forms. At the
same time, various groups of administrative officials and political leaders
have become an important and sustained infrastructure of the gray
economy in this country.
Indirect evidence to this is found in the still flourishing trade in con-
sumer goods of evidently illegal imports. Revealing of the scope of this
type of activity is the market of tobacco products in 1998. According to
marketing estimates, the share of the smuggled tobacco products is about
12-15% (valued at DEM 35-42 million, which gives an idea of the corrup-
tion potential of the grey economy).
The corruption pressure over business. In 1999 possibilities in this
respect seem to have increased. The reasons are found in the numerous
licensing regimes and the tax policy implemented.
The activities requiring a license (and implying huge discretionary
power of the state apparatus) are continually increasing in number. From
55 in 1996, to 65 in 1997, 86 in 1998, to 106 in 1999. The need to
acquire a license, as a condition for starting economic activity, makes
bribery a cheaper and faster way of doing business. The negative as-
pects of licensing are reinforced by the inefficiency of the judicial system
(and respectively, of the procedures for appealing against refusals).
Fiscal policy relies on high taxes, which makes their evasion eco-
nomically profitable. In order to increase the rate of tax collection the role
of the lower ranks of the tax administration grows more important. This,
however, often finds expression in arbitrary interpretation of fiscal prob-
lems by the specific tax inspector. On the other hand, the procedure for
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THE GRAY ECONOMY
appealing against taxation acts is slow (i.e., costly). Hence, fiscal pressure
leads to corruption in the form of a compromising settlement be-
tween the economic agent and the tax inspector.
In the past year insufficient conditions have been created in the
economy for limiting the opportunities for corruption. At the same time,
corruption is becoming ever more refined and is more rarely reduced
to violations of the law. All too often, acts leading to corruption are trans-
gressing the spirit, rather than the letter, of the law. This makes the sanc-
tioning of corrupt behavior extremely difficult.
Curbing corruption in the
economy calls for the use of pri-
vatization procedures guarantee-
ing transparency and accountabil-
ity in the privatization process.
Negotiations with potential buy-
ers ought to be regulated as a
special option applicable upon
decision by the Council of Min-
isters to privatization deals in-
volving enterprises of key impor-
tance to the economy, monopo-
listic structures, and in cases of
great factual and legal complex-
ity. There should be clear-cut and
thorough regulation of the super-
visory functions, competencies
and powers of the Supervisory
Board of the Privatization Agency
for sanctioning violations of the
prescribed procedures at all
stages of the privatization deals.
Considerable potential for curbing corruption emerges on the basis
of the Program for Optimization of Administrative Procedures under Li-
cense Permit and Registration Regimes adopted with Decision N 687 of
the Council of Ministers of November 3, 1999. Its execution has already
begun but the bulk of it will be implemented in 2000.
A considerable potential for curbing corruption in the economy could
also  be found in the activities of professional and business associations
through their sector and national structures. Business circles in Bulgaria
are not particularly sensitive to the issue of corruption and seem to per-
ceive it as part of the landscape. They are not sufficiently aware of their
mission and the potential benefits to business in general from the adop-
tion of certain ethical rules and norms.
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D. CIVIL SOCIETY
D.1. Non-Governmental
Organizations
The initiatives of Bulgarian NGOs have had a considerable on impact on an
international level. Drawing on the Coalition 2000 model, similar programs are
being designed in Romania, Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The
corruption monitoring techniques are also being employed in countries such as
Hungary and Turkey.
NUMBER OF REGISTERED CORRUPTION-RELATED MATERIALS IN THE PRESS BY WEEK
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 CORRUPTION-RELATED MATERIALS IN THE PRESS
It is important to note that Bulgarian non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) have played a significant role in assessing the scope of corrup-
tion in this country. It was precisely the analyses of third-sector research
institutes that showed that the rise of corrupt practices after 1990 was
leading to deepening mistrust in the political elite. The established public
standing of the Bulgarian NGO sector has allowed it to become the initia-
tor of the debate on corruption.
The preconditions for the successful establishment of the third sector
in the countrys anti-corruption efforts have been:
l the considerable analytical potential which a number of NGOs have
managed to mobilize (specifically in the socio-economics field);
l the developed network of broad-profile and more specialized organi-
zations covering almost the entire territory of the country;
l good communications with the mass media;
l dynamic cooperation with international institutions;
l support from international donor organizations.
A convincing evidence of
this role is the Coalition 2000
process, which began in the
spring of 1997. This pioneering
initiative brought together for the
first time representatives of state
institutions and NGOs in the
fight against corruption in this
country. For its part, Transpar-
ency International created a
Bulgarian chapter, TI Bulgaria; a
number of NGOs outside the
capital city also joined in various
anti-corruption initiatives. In
1999 the NGOs united under
Coalition 2000 implemented a
range of specific activities aimed
at countering the most wide-
spread corrupt practices and cre-
ating institutional, legal, organi-
zational, behavioral, and other
preconditions for curbing cor-
ruption in the country. These
included:
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D.2. Mass Media
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CORRUPTION-RELATED MATERIALS IN THE MEDIA
l The Clean Future public awareness campaign, which covered the
whole country.
l A number of public officials and experts were involved in conceptu-
alizing and implementing measures to limit identified corrupt prac-
tices.
l Within the framework of Coalition 2000, local anti-corruption projects
were launched in 14 municipalities. They were aimed at enhancing
transparency of local government and reinforcing the anti-corruption
watchdog role of civil society.
l Anti-corruption councils were formed on a municipal and/or district
level, which involved local government authorities, municipal coun-
cils, the courts, prosecution and investigators offices, police, and tax
services, among others.
l A number of international conferences were held at which Bulgarian
NGOs presented the coalition model of counteracting corruption.
l The periodic publication of the Coalition 2000 Corruption Indexes
kept up the public debate.
In the past year the mass media played an exceptional role in mobilizing
the public opinion against corruption. The good cooperation between
NGOs and the media was particularly beneficial in creating a climate of
public intolerance towards corruption. As the public opinion became more
demanding with respect to journalists, the journalist organizations grew
more intolerant to corruption. There is no accident in the fact that the
public opinion consistently rates NGOs and journalists among the least
corrupt categories.
The monitoring of key Bulgarian media registered a clear trend to-
wards an increasing presence of corruption as a topic of media interest. It
would not be an exaggera-
tion to say that corruption
has become a number one
topic in Bulgarian mass me-
dia, particularly in the sec-
ond half of 1999. Several im-
portant aspects can be dis-
tinguished within this trend:
l The topic is discussed
and interpreted by the me-
dia very specifically and ana-
lytically. Most of the major
mass media, the press in par-
ticular, are beginning to over-
come the stage of mere sen-
sationalism in presenting the
topic and expose specific
acts of corruption in a very
professional manner. A circle
of journalists ahs emerged
within the community of Bul-
garian reporters who not
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only confidently present specific cases of corrupt behavior to the
general public, but likewise reveal the hidden mechanisms which make
such behavior possible, successful, difficult to identify and penalize.
l There is every reason to claim that the media have managed to ex-
pose the corrupt nature of a broad range of existing unlawful prac-
tices. The media have raised social awareness and have thus helped
foster public intolerance towards the entire diversity of forms and
nuances of corrupt behavior. The media have largely managed to
create an adequate vocabulary for the public debate on corruption.
l An unquestionable achievement of the media in 1999 is the fact that
they shifted the public attention from everyday petty corruption
to corruption at the top. Moreover, the focus on corruption was no
longer based on political confrontation (in the past ten years the media
have talked about corruption but always in the narrow framework of
political confrontation). This type of politicized discourse has been
largely superficial and has ultimately impeded a deeper grasp of the
mechanisms generating corruption.
l The instances have become more frequent when the media did not
simply cover acts of corruption registered by law-enforcement au-
thorities but actively drew the public attention to facts, which called
for further investigation. In their efforts the media used their own
journalist methods as well as information from citizens and NGOs.
Sometimes this cooperation has almost spontaneously grown into
examples of effective coalitions involving media, civil society, law-
enforcement authorities, and public administration. Unfortunately, such
coalitions are typically incidental and unsustainable.
l It should be noted that in the course of the past year certain publica-
tions and radio and TV programs initiated considerable public de-
bate on legislation in the field of legal and economic reform, which
drew the public attention to specific provisions in the laws that could
generate a risk of corruption. In this way, the leading Bulgarian media
have made their contribution to the prevention of corruption.
l The media proved more successful than in previous years in making
Bulgarian politicians assume specific public commitments concern-
ing cases of corruption and thus in creating conditions for civic con-
trol over the political class.
Certain problems can, however, be noted as regards the coverage of
corruption issues by the mass media:
l The national electronic media  mostly television  which are the
undeniable information leaders, were relatively inert towards the is-
sue. The impression was created that the national electronic media
fear the topic itself and they have not yet outlived the reflexes typical
of state, rather than public, media. Placed in a situation of pending
licensing, the private electronic media too preferred to follow behind
the events and cover official statements.
l Even those media, which showed the greatest concerned with the
topic of corruption, had a rather short attention span and quickly lost
interest in the development of cases, which they had themselves
brought out to the public attention. Indirectly, such behavior leads to
public demobilization and an impression that none of the signalized
cases would have a legal consequence.
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l Without being a deficiency of the mass media alone, the lack of co-
operation between the media and the law-enforcement authorities is
a serious problem for Bulgarian society. As a result of the absence of
such dialogue, the public at large is almost completely unaware of
cases of corruption, which have ended in legal sanction. This circum-
stance keeps reproducing the popular perception that corruption in
this country practically goes unpunished.
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E. DYNAMICS OF CORRUPT BEHAVIOR AND
CHANGE IN PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS
CORRUPTION
In terms of the scope of corrupt practices and the state of public atti-
tudes towards the various forms of corrupt behavior, the situation in
Bulgaria remains unfavorable.
Internationally the countrys position in the Transparency International
ranking did not change substantially over the period 1998-1999. In the
Transparency International rating Bulgaria occupies an altogether unenvi-
able place (63rd in 1999 and 67th in 1998) among the countries featured
(85 in 1998 and 99 in 1999). This indicates that compared to other coun-
tries corruption in Bulgaria is a serious problem. Quantitatively, the value
of the Transparency International index for Bulgaria is 3.3. This is much
closer to the most unfavorable value (1.0) than the most favorable one
(10.0) and suggests that the problem is yet to be addressed.
For the Bulgarian citizens, the intensity of corruption in this country
(frequency of involvement in corrupt practices) is high and remained es-
sentially unchanged in the period June 1998  September 1999. How-
ever, one positive development is to be observed: there has been a visible
fall in the frequency of cases when citizens experienced pressure from
public sector officials to engage in acts of corruption.
Over the past year there
emerged several notable
changes:
l The data of the Coalition 2000
Corruption Monitoring System
clearly show a positive change
in attitudes against corruption
(higher intolerance). Citizens are
less likely to accept various forms
of corruption as normal and to
use corrupt practices as a means
of coping with problems. A cli-
mate of intolerance towards cor-
ruption and a critical attitude to-
wards corrupt public officials, in-
cluding in the high ranks of
power, is being fostered in soci-
ety. This could constitute a
favorable environment for devel-
opment of anti-corruption cam-
paigns and for support of any ef-
forts by state institutions to limit
corruption.
l The more critical public atti-
tude towards corruption and its
Public opinion is becoming less tolerant towards corruption and less inclined to
use corrupt practices (Figure 1). A positive development is also to be observed
with respect to the pressure to give bribes exerted over citizens by officials in
the public sector (Figure 2). Nevertheless, the actual frequency of citizen in-
volvement in acts of corruption remains unchanged.
Source: Coalition 2000 CMSSource: Coalition 2000 CMS
FIGURE 2
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more intensive exposure in the media have reinforced the assump-
tions shared by different social strata that corruption is a wide-
spread and socially effective practice. Expectations have increased
that there will arise new social mechanisms which will simultaneously
be legitimate, morally admissible, and effective.
l For the most part public opinion consistently qualifies as corrupt the
sectors of: customs, the tax administration, the court system (includ-
ing judges, lawyers, court officials, prosecutors), and the police.
Public opinion has become far more critical towards corruption and
the policy claiming to fight it. In 1999 there was a tangible fall in public
confidence that the authorities are truly taking steps to counteract corrup-
tion. The reasons for this are of varying nature:
l The government has been slow
to respond to the anti-corruption
campaign launched by civil soci-
ety structures.
l In the political debate corrup-
tion-related facts and disclosures
are being used as means against
political opponents and for gain-
ing political dividends.
l There is a suspicions that the
public administration has a strong
interest in covering up corruption
if it involves those close to the
government.
l Anti-corruption issues are still
not adequately covered within
the system of education. The
topic of corruption is completely
absent from secondary and uni-
versity education, and only spo-
radically appears in civic educa-
tion conducted by various non-
governmental organizations. This
is a sphere where the state ought
to support the non-profit organi-
zations that are able to assist the
education process, specifically
with respect to introducing the
anti-corruption subject into the school curricula. They need to be
given broader access to the education process, with corruption treated
in the context of the subject of the State and the risk of state defor-
mation. From the very beginning of their education, young people
need to realize that it is really up to them in what kind of state 
corrupt or not  they will live.
As a result of the more critical public attitude and changed public expectations,
citizens pessimism has grown. The predominant part of the countrys adult
population (18 and over) are convinced they live in a society where corruption
is a serious problem and a socially effective means of coping with arising every-
day problems.
CORRUPTION EXPECTATIONS
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ASSESSMENTS OF THE SPREAD OF CORRUPTION
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F. INTERNATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION
COOPERATION
In 1999, the problem of corruption was highlighted in the work of many
international organizations and in international exchange in general. The
globalization of this exchange increasingly calls for a treatment of corrup-
tion similar to the treatment of security issues after the end of the cold
war  as a problem of the entire international community, which cannot
be addressed by national measures alone. In this context, Bulgarias coop-
eration with the international community has played an important role in
encouraging the fight against corruption in this country.
Notable among the international legal commitments taken on by the
country in the past period are the signing of the Criminal Law Convention
and Civil Law Convention of the Council of Europe (CE) and the acces-
sion to the Group of Countries against Corruption  GRECO. By opening
the two conventions for accession the Council became a leading interna-
tional organization in the fight against corruption, which is particularly
important in view of its pan-European nature. Together with the participa-
tion in the Octopus II program of the Council (a joint initiative with the
European Commission), the signing of the two conventions is a step for-
ward in Bulgarias involvement in the development and implementation
of international anti-corruption standards. Two conventions entail the ob-
ligation to adopt certain standards in domestic legislation. In this way 
unlike the mechanism of the Octopus project limited to intergovernmen-
tal cooperation  the ratification of the conventions and the subsequent
amendments to national law will have a potentially broader social effect.
To this end it is necessary for the alignment of the domestic legislation to
be a transparent process involving all concerned institutions from the public
and private sectors in this country. Additional positive effect could be
achieved through possible linkages between the monitoring of the en-
forcement of the conventions in the countries (GRECO), which will be
confined to consultations among the institutions of the executive, and the
efforts of civil society in this area.
The problem of corruption in the relations between Bulgaria and the
European Union (EU) is considered above all in the broader context of
the measures to prepare the country for EU membership. To EU, corrup-
tion is a problem related above all to the protection of the financial inter-
ests of the Union, the normal functioning of the Internal Market and of
competition as its fundamental principle. In addition, Bulgaria is facing
the task of effective adoption of the EU legislation  acquis communautaire
 in the sphere of justice and internal affairs and more specifically, the
fight against corruption and organized crime.
One important aspect of these relations is found in the fact that the
acquis communautaire in the area of justice and internal affairs includes
not only the instruments adopted by EU, but likewise the international
instruments of CE and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) in this sphere. With the signing and ratification by
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Bulgaria of the Convention on the Fight against Bribery of Foreign Officials
in International Business Transactions of OECD the country could be said
to have taken important steps forward on the road of harmonization with
EU law.
The assistance provided by the European Commission to Bulgaria in
the fight against corruption in the context of accession is focused on the
work of the administration. In the past period a number of  anti-corruption
projects, implemented by the administration, were funded in the context
of pre-accession assistance.  In its regular report on the countrys progress
towards accession of October 1999 the Commission noted that progress
in the fight against corruption appears more hesitant  and recommended
further measures in the following areas: financing of political parties,
strengthening of the legal framework in  areas such as public procure-
ment, financial control, liability of Ministers, improving the implementa-
tion of measures in areas such as money laundering and creating or
strengthening internal and external control structures in the administra-
tion and the judiciary (including among prosecutors). Transparency and
judicial control should be reinforced  in the privatization field.
The problem of corruption in the context of structural reform is not
visibly present in the work of international organizations in Bulgaria. In
view of the crucial importance of the structural reform to the success of
the transition to market economy and the obstacles posed by corruption
to economic growth and human development in the countries in transi-
tion, it is recommended to propose specific initiatives in this area that
would involve the international organizations concerned, as well as bilat-
eral and multilateral donors.
In the past period, an important event with implications for the anti-
corruption processes in Bulgaria was the adoption of the Stability Pact
for Southeastern Europe. In the Pact, corruption is treated in the context
of strengthening security, thus stressing the international character of the
measures needed for its overcoming, especially as regards the countries
of the region. While it is still too early to evaluate the effect of the Pact,
there is no doubt Bulgaria ought to assume a leading role in proposing
and implementing anti-corruption initiatives of a regional scope, drawing
on its experience in establishing the rule of law in general, as well as in the
cooperation between the institutions of the state and civil society in this
area.
In conclusion, it is necessary to note the important role of non-gov-
ernmental organizations for the development of the international con-
tacts of Bulgaria in the fight against corruption. The cooperation of Coali-
tion 2000 with a number of foreign agencies, non-governmental organiza-
tions, and international organizations, especially in South-East Europe, was
a substantial contribution towards assisting the country in sharing the lead-
ing international experience in this field. Thus the support provided by the
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to Coali-
tion 2000 is a model of cooperation, which ought to be encouraged in
the future.
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v v v
In the past year international observers such as the World Bank, the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, Transparency International, the European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development, and large private financial organi-
zations have evaluated positively the tendencies in the fight against cor-
ruption. According to the Transparency International evaluation, within
one year Bulgaria has moved from the 67th to the 63rd position in the
world rating by level of corruption. This small step forward is encouraging
but the position attained clearly demonstrate the great distance at which
the country stands from European standards.
The improved standing of the country is due to such positive changes
as the enhancement of the anti-corruption legislation, the launching of
the public administration reform, reduced state participation in the
economy, and the significantly limited gray economy.
Most serious ground for optimism, however, is found in the fact that
these small steps fail to weaken the resolve of civil society in Bulgaria. This
is evidenced by the widening gap between the evaluations from the out-
side and the internal self-evaluations of the achievements in countering
corruption.
In the ten years of transition to a democratic society and market
economy, Bulgarian society has failed to cope with the corruption prob-
lem. The past year, however, gives us sufficient reason to believe that we
have avoided the danger of turning from a society with corruption into a
corrupt society.
